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a countable set of agents. A numerical social welfare function is invariant
to ordinal transformation, satis￿es a weak monotonicity condition, and an
invariance with respect to concatenation of utility streams if and only if it
is either the sup, inf, lim sup, or lim inf. Keywords: intergenerational
equity, supremum, limit superior.
￿Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology. Mail
Code 228-77. Phone: (626) 395-3559. Email: chambers@hss.caltech.edu. I would like to thank
Federico Echenique, Marc Fleurbaey, and Toyotaka Sakai for discussions on intergenerational
equity. Two anonymous referees and the Associate Editor also provided very useful comments.
All errors are my own.
11. Introduction
This note provides a simple characterization of a family of social choice rules for
the problem of intergenerational equity. The goal is to rank utility streams. We
imagine that a countably in￿nite set of agents is given, and we want to aggregate
their utilities in a ￿fair￿way. Traditionally, fairness has meant some form of
anonymity, so that the names of agents should be irrelevant in making social
judgments.
In this work, we discuss a new axiom. It describes what happens when we put
together two disjoint societies of agents. Suppose we have two disjoint collections
of agents, perhaps agents in di⁄erent countries or di⁄erent regions. Suppose we
apply our rule to each of these sets of agents, and ￿nd out that each of these
societies is equally well o⁄ according to our rule. What should happen when we
treat these two societies as one large society? It seems natural to require that the
large society should be just as well-o⁄ as either of the individual societies. We
refer to this axiom as reinforcement.
Usually, the theory of ranking in￿nite utility streams has taken as primitive a
countably in￿nite set of agents, and has required conditions on functions mapping
from utility streams to the reals. Classical results in this theory tell us that
such a function cannot be continuous (in the sup-norm topology), anonymous (in
almost any sense), and compatible with the strong Pareto relation (for example,
see Diamond [8]). The impossibility obtains because we require the existence
of a function, as opposed to an ordinal ranking of utility streams. In a sense,
the real numbers are not a large enough set to embed all sequences in a strictly
monotonic way. If numerical measurement is not desired, then possibility results
obtain (see Svensson [25]). Many works are devoted to investigating the nature
of this impossibility: see, for example, [3, 4, 12, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 29]. Other
works related to the theory of intergenerational equity include [1, 5, 6, 10]
We bypass these impossibilities by assuming a weakened form of the Pareto
principle (which we call monotonicity): if everybody in society is made at least
as well o⁄ under one utility stream than under another, then society as a whole
is made at least as well o⁄. We make no statements about strict preference of
agents or society in formulating this property.
Our ￿nal property formalizes the notion that utility should be interpersonally
comparable, yet have no cardinal signi￿cance. We refer to it as ordinal covariance.
A variant of this axiom has been studied in this context before; see Lauwers [15].
It ￿nds a role in social choice theory in general, see for example [2, 11, 13, 20, 21];where it is often used to axiomatize the rank-order dictatorships. In particular, it
states that when transforming utility of agents in an arbitrary way, social utility
should be transformed in the same way. Our techniques relating to this axiom
are adapted from an earlier paper which axiomatizes a broad class of functions as
a type of quantile, see Chambers [7].
Our three axioms, reinforcement, monotonicity, and ordinal covariance, charac-
terize a class of exactly four rules: the supremum, the in￿mum, the limit superior,
and the limit inferior.
Section 2 provides the model and axioms. Section 3 discusses the main result.
Section 4 studies some alternative axiomatizations. Section 5 is devoted to the
independence of the axioms. Finally, Section 6 proposes some open problems.
2. Model and axioms
Let N, the natural numbers, be a countably in￿nite set of agents. We will work
with the set l1(N), the set of bounded sequences (we will henceforth call this set
U), interpreted as utility streams. A typical element will be speci￿ed u 2 U,
where u = (u(i))i2N. In particular, note that u 2 U, by de￿nition, is formally a
function from N into R. Thus, for example, given a function ￿ : N ! N, u ￿ ￿ is
well-de￿ned as ((u ￿ ￿)(i))i2N = (u(￿ (i)))i2N.
Our main interest will be in studying social choice functions T : U ! R. Note
that we are already making a restrictive assumption by requiring that the social
ordering of utility streams be representable by a numerical function.
The following axiom is typical for this literature:
Anonymity: For all u 2 U and all bijections from ￿ : N ! N, T (u ￿ ￿) = Tu.
We introduce a reinforcement condition that we believe has not yet been stated
in the literature. Consider some ￿nite collection of utility streams. Suppose they
are all ranked as equivalent according to the function T. Suppose we form a new
utility stream which is composed of the original, ￿nite collection of utility streams,
in the sense that every element in every original utility stream is mapped to some
element in the new utility stream, and conversely. We require that the new
utility stream so constructed is ranked as equivalent to all of the original utility
streams. This condition encompasses the strongest notions of anonymity existing
in the literature. However, it is a very natural condition if it is believed that the
sequencing of when utility values are faced is completely irrelevant. Conditionsrelated to this are pervasive in the social choice literature on variable populations
and in fair allocation theory, where the population is typically ￿nite (for example,
see Thomson [26] or Young [28]). Such variable population axioms relate the
utility or allocation of groups to the utility or allocation of larger groups. Our
particular axiom is a weak form of the statement that a large society cannot be
strictly better o⁄(or strictly worse o⁄) than each of its subsocieties; applying only
when each subsociety has the same social utility.
For K 2 N and a bijection ￿ : N ! N￿f1;:::;Kg, we will write for each i 2 N,
￿ (i) = (￿1 (i);￿2 (i)), where ￿1 : N ! N and ￿2 : N ! f1;:::;Kg.
Reinforcement: Let fujg
K
j=1 ￿ U, where K < +1. Suppose that for all
j;k 2 f1;:::;Kg, Tuj = Tuk. Let ￿ : N ! N ￿ f1;:::;Kg be a bijection.
De￿ne u￿ (i) ￿ u￿2(i) (￿1 (i)). Then Tu￿ = Tu1.
Reinforcement is a much stronger axiom than anonymity; it forces the in-
di⁄erence sets of the social welfare function to be large. Anonymity requires
indi⁄erence sets to be invariant under permutation, whereas reinforcement re-
quires them to be invariant under permutation and concatenation. Thus, we rule
out many potentially interesting rules by its imposition (see Section 2.2). While
mathematically it is quite strong, conceptually it seems natural.
We now discuss our monotonicity axiom.
Monotonicity: Let u;u0 2 U and suppose that for all i 2 N, u(i) ￿ u0(i). Then
Tu ￿ Tu0.
Ordinal covariance: Let u 2 U, and let ’ : R ! R be continuous and strictly
increasing. Then T(’ ￿ u) = ’(Tu).
3. Main result
The following lemma is useful. It illustrates that under ordinal covariance, the
social utility must essentially be a utility held by one of the members in the
society. In the extreme case in which there are only two levels of utility held by
members of society, say, when the utility pro￿le takes the form 1E for some E ￿ N,
then T1E 2 f0;1g. In particular, this illustrates that a rule which is ordinally
covariant rules out tradeo⁄s or compromises. So, for example, T1E 2 (0;1) is
here ruled out. This is because a compromise in utility space incorporates cardinal
information.Lemma 1: Suppose that T is ordinally covariant. Then for all u 2 U, Tu 2
u(N).1
Proof. Suppose that the statement of the Lemma is false. Then there exists
u 2 U such that Tu 2 Rnu(N). In particular, there exists a neighborhood V of
Tu so that V \ u(N) = ?. Without loss of generality, we may assume that V is
an open interval, say (Tu ￿ ";Tu + "). Let ’ : R ! R be de￿ned as
’(x) ￿
￿
x for x = 2 (Tu ￿ ";Tu + ")
(x￿(Tu￿"))2
2" + (Tu ￿ ") for x 2 (Tu ￿ ";Tu + ")
.
For all x 2 (Tu ￿ ";Tu + "), ’(x) < x. In particular, as (Tu ￿ ";Tu + ") \
u(N) = ?, ’ ￿ u = u. As Tu 2 (Tu ￿ ";Tu + "), ’(Tu) < Tu. Hence
Tu = T (’ ￿ u) = ’(Tu) < Tu. Here, the second equality follows from ordinal
covariance. The expression Tu < Tu is impossible. ￿
Theorem 1: A function T satis￿es reinforcement, monotonicity, and ordinal co-
variance if and only if it is either the supremum, the in￿mum, the limit
superior, or the limit inferior.
Proof. It is easy to check that each of the four functions discussed above
satis￿es the three axioms. Conversely, suppose that T satis￿es the three axioms.
By the lemma, for all E ￿ N, T1E 2 f0;1g; moreover, T1N = 1 and T0 = 0.
De￿ne E ￿ fE ￿ N : T(1E) = 0g. Note that if E 2 E and if F ￿ E, then by
monotonicity, 0 = T0 ￿ T1F ￿ T1E = 0, so that F 2 E. Moreover, ? 2 E and
N = 2E.
De￿ne ￿ = 2N. We will establish three facts.
Fact 1: For all E;F 2 ￿ for which jEj < +1 and jFj < +1, E 2 E , F 2
E.
Fact 2: For all E;F 2 ￿ for which jEj = +1 and jNnEj = +1, and
jFj = +1 and jNnFj = +1, E 2 E , F 2 E.
Fact 3: For all E;F 2 ￿ for which jNnEj < +1 and jNnFj < +1, E 2 E ,
F 2 E.
To establish fact 1, we show that T1f1g = T1f1;:::;Kg for all K < +1. Let
uj = 1f1g for j = 1;:::;K. For all k ￿ K, let ￿ (mK + k) = (m + 1;k). Then
u￿ = 1f1;:::;Kg. By reinforcement, T1f1;:::;Kg = T1f1g. For any ￿nite set E 2 ￿,
1Let u 2 U; as is standard we de￿ne u(N) = fu(i) : i 2 Ng. For a set A ￿ R, A denotes its
closure in the Euclidean topology.let ￿ be a bijection such that ￿ (f1;:::;jEjg) = E. Then T1f1;:::;jEjg = T1E. Fact
1 follows.
To establish fact 2, let E;F 2 ￿ satisfy jEj = +1 and jNnEj = +1, and
jFj = +1 and jNnFj = +1. List the elements of E as E = fe1;e2;:::g and the
elements of F as F = ff1;f2;:::g. List the elements of NnE as fe0
1;e0
2;:::g and the
elements of NnF as ff0
1;f0




￿. Hence, by reinforcement, T1E = T1F. The second fact follows.
Fact 3 follows similarly to fact 1. Therefore, all three facts are true.
Let us now consider several various cases. We will calculate, in each case, an
explicit expression for
inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : u(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg.
A later step of the proof will establish that in general,
Tu = inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : u(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg.
Case 1: E contains only the empty set.
In this case, we claim that for all u 2 U,
inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : u(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg = sup
i2N
u(i).
Let z = inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : u(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg. Then in particular, for all
" > 0, fi 2 N : u(i) ￿ z ￿ "g 6= ?; so there exist i 2 N for which u(i) ￿ z ￿
". Consequently, as " is arbitrary, supi2N u(i) ￿ z. Moreover, for all " > 0,
fi 2 N : u(i) ￿ z + "g = ?; consequently, z + " > supi2N u(i) for all ". Again as
" is arbitrary, z ￿ supi2N u(i). Conclude z = supi2N u(i).
Case 2: E contains a ￿nite nonempty set, but no in￿nite sets.
By fact 1, E contains all ￿nite nonempty sets. In this case we verify that
inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : u(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg = limsup
i2N
u(i).
Let z = inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : u(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg. Let " > 0; then by de￿n-
ition jfi 2 N : u(i) ￿ z ￿ "gj is in￿nite. Consequently, by de￿nition of limsup,
limsupi2N u(i) ￿ z ￿ ", and as " is arbitrary, limsupi2N u(i) ￿ z. Let " > 0;
then by de￿nition jfi 2 N : u(i) ￿ z + "gj is ￿nite. Consequently, by de￿nition
of limsup, limsupi2N u(i) < z + ", and as " is arbitrary, limsupi2N u(i) ￿ z.
Conclude z = limsupi2N u(i).Case 3: E contains an in￿nite set, but no co￿nite set.
By fact 2, E contains all in￿nite sets whose complements are in￿nite and all
￿nite sets. In this case, it can be veri￿ed that for all u 2 U,
inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : u(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg = liminf
i2N
u(i).
This can be veri￿ed similarly to case 2.
Case 4: E contains a co￿nite set.
In this case, it contains all co￿nite sets by fact 3 and hence contains all sets
but N. In this case, it can be veri￿ed that
inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : u(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg = inf
i2N
u(i).
This can be veri￿ed similarly to case 1.
Thus, the theorem will follow if in each case, for all u 2 U, Tu = inffx 2 R :
fi 2 N : u(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg. We will verify this statement.
As a ￿rst step, we show that for all E 2 ￿, T1E = inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿
xg 2 Eg. To see this, recall that T1E 2 f0;1g (by Lemma 1). Suppose T1E = 0.
Then by de￿nition of E, E 2 E. For all " 2 (0;1), fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿ "g = E, so
that fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿ "g 2 E. Hence inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg < ".
As " is arbitrary, inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg ￿ 0. Now, suppose that
" < 0. Then fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿ "g = N and N = 2 E. Consequently,
inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg = 0.
Suppose instead that T1E = 1. Then E = 2 E. In particular, for all " > 0, fi 2 N :
1E(i) ￿ 1 + "g = ?, and ? 2 E, so that inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg <
1 + ". As " is arbitrary, conclude inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg ￿ 1. Now
let " < 0. Then E ￿ fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿ 1 + "g, so that fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿ 1 + "g = 2 E;
consequently, inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg = 1. Thus, we obtain
T1E = inffx 2 R : fi 2 N : 1E(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg.
It remains to extend this representation to the arbitrary utility pro￿les.
This part of the proof mimics [7] (Theorem 1, p. 420). Let u 2 U and
let x￿ (u) = inf fx : fi : u(i) ￿ xg 2 Eg. Let " > 0 be arbitrary. Then




supu for i : u(i) ￿ x￿ (u) + "
x￿ (u) + " otherwise :Then u ￿ g", so that by monotonicity, Tu ￿ Tg". Note that
fi : u(i) ￿ x￿ (u) + "g 2 E, so that fi : g" (i) ￿ supug 2 E. As g" is an ordi-
nal transformation of the indicator function of fi : u(i) ￿ x￿ (u) + "g, we may
conclude Tg" = x￿ (u) + ". As " is arbitrary, Tu ￿ x￿ (u).




inf u for i : u(i) < x￿ (u) ￿ "
x￿ (u) ￿ " otherwise .
Then u ￿ h". Moreover, fi : u(i) ￿ x￿ (u) ￿ "g = 2 E. But u(i) ￿ x￿ (u) ￿ " if
and only if h" (i) ￿ x￿ (u) ￿ ". Therefore, fi : h" (i) ￿ x￿ (u) ￿ "g = 2 E. As h"
is an ordinal transformation of the indicator function of fi : u(i) ￿ x￿ (u) ￿ "g,
we may conclude Th" = x￿ (u) ￿ ". By monotonicity, Tu ￿ x￿ (u) ￿ ". As " is
arbitrary, Tu ￿ x￿ (u).
Conclude Tu = x￿(u), so that the theorem is true. ￿
4. Alternative axiomatizations
Lauwers [15] axiomatizes the in￿mum rule using axioms very closely related to
ours. He works in a completely ordinal framework; however. He also imposes
variants of monotonicity and ordinal covariance. His version of monotonicity is
slightly stronger; while his version of ordinal covariance is slightly weaker. More-
over, he also requires invariance with respect to arbitrary permutations. In ad-
dition to this, however, he requires continuity in the sup-norm topology and a
condition that he calls the ￿repetition-approximation￿principle. Very roughly,
the repetition approximation principle requires that the value of a function ap-
plied to a sequence can be approximated arbitrarily closely by the ￿value￿of ￿nite
subsequences of the sequence. He rules out the supremum function by the use of
a mild equity axiom.
We formally state two of Lauwers￿axioms specialized to our environment.
Topologize U with the sup-norm topology. This topology is de￿ned by the metric
d : U ￿ U ! R given by
d(u;v) = sup
i2N
ju(i) ￿ v (i)j.
Ordinal level comparability: For all u;v 2 U and all ’ : R ! R continuous
and strictly increasing, Tu ￿ Tv () T (’ ￿ u) ￿ T (’ ￿ v).Continuity: T is continuous in the sup-norm topology.
Proposition 1: Suppose that T is monotonic and continuous. If T satis￿es or-
dinal level comparability, then either T is constant, or there is a strictly
increasing and continuous function ￿ : T (U) ! R such that ￿ ￿ T is ordi-
nally covariant.
Proof. Suppose that T is not constant. Consequently, there exist u;v 2 U
for which Tu > Tv. There exist x;y 2 R such that x1N ￿ u and v ￿ y1N (as u and
v are bounded), so that by monotonicity, T (x1N) > T (y1N). By monotonicity, it
follows that x > y. Now, suppose that w;z 2 R and that w > z. Let ’ : R !
R be any strictly increasing and continuous function for which ’(x) = w and
’(y) = z. Note that as T (x1N) > T (y1N), ordinal level comparability implies
that T (w1N) > T (z1N). In particular, by continuity and monotonicity, this
implies that T (U) = fT (r1N) : r 2 Rg. To see this, fT (r1N) : r 2 Rg ￿ T (U),
so suppose u 2 U. Then by monotonicity and continuity, using the fact that
fr1N : r 2 Rg is sup norm connected, we establish the existence of xu 2 R for
which T (u) = T (xu1N), so that T (U) ￿ fT (r1N) : r 2 Rg. In particular, the
function f : R ! R de￿ned by f (x) = T (x1N) is strictly monotonic and can easily
be veri￿ed to be continuous; it hence has a continuous and strictly monotonic
inverse f￿1 de￿ned on T (U). Let ￿ = f￿1. We want to show that ￿ ￿ T is
ordinally covariant. In particular, note that for all x 2 R, (￿ ￿ T)(x1N) = x.
So let u 2 U and let ’ : R ! R be strictly increasing and continuous. Then
Tu = T (xu1N) so that by ordinal level comparability, T (’ ￿ u) = T (’ ￿ (xu1N)) =
T (’(xu)1N). Moreover, (￿ ￿ T)(u) = (￿ ￿ T)(xu1N) = xu and (￿ ￿ T)(’ ￿ u) =
(￿ ￿ T)(’(xu)1N) = ’(xu), establishing the claim. ￿
The preceding result shows that, instead of assuming ordinal covariance, we
may have instead assumed sup-norm continuity and ordinal unit comparability
and obtained (ordinally) the same results. The only additional rules which would
emerge are the constant rules.
The following axiom is also somewhat related to the current study. It appears
in this form in E￿mov and Koshevoy [9], but the conceptual idea dates back at
least to Kolmogorov [14] and Nagumo [18].2







2We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting a study of this axiom.
3By uN, we mean the projection of u onto the utility subspace spanned by the utilities of theThe following result establishes that !-decomposability implies reinforcement
under the axioms of ordinal covariance and anonymity.
Proposition 2: Suppose T satis￿es ordinal covariance, !-decomposability, and
anonymity. Then it satis￿es reinforcement.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose K = 2, and suppose that
Tu1 = Tu2. The claim for general K follows by induction. Let ￿ : N !
N ￿ f1;2g be a bijection, and consider u￿. We claim that Tu￿ = Tu1. To















































The preceding result illustrates that we could have replaced our reinforcement
axiom with !-decomposability, characterizing the same family.
5. Independence of axioms
We here demonstrate the independence of the axioms. For each of the three
axioms, a rule satisfying the remaining two but not the axiom itself is presented.
Veri￿cation that the rules satisfy the remaining axioms is left to the reader.
Reinforcement: We here de￿ne an analogue of the rank order dictatorships
which is meaningful for in￿nite sets of agents. In general, there may not
exist an agent with a ￿k-th highest utility;￿so the standard de￿nition is
meaningless here. Instead, let k 2 N, and de￿ne the k-th order dictatorship
as
T
ku = inf fx 2 R : jfi 2 N : u(i) ￿ xgj ￿ k ￿ 1g.
In particular, for k = 1, T ku = supi u(i). Suppose instead k is arbitrary;
we demonstrate its value for a few sequences. Suppose u￿ 2 U is de￿ned as
u￿ (i) = ￿1=i. Then T ku￿ = 0 (regardless of k). However, suppose u0 2 U
is de￿ned as u0 (i) = 1=i. Then T ku0 = 1=k. In addition to being ordinally
agents in N. By T (uN)
N, we mean the the constant vector in RN in which each agent has a
utility of T (uN).covariant and monotonic, the rank order dictatorships are also anonymous.
In fact, together with the rules for which
T
ku = supfx 2 R : jfi 2 N : u(i) ￿ xgj ￿ k ￿ 1g,
and the rules characterized in Theorem 1, these rules exhaust the family of
rules satisfying anonymity, monotonicity, and ordinal covariance (the proof
is similar to that of the main theorem). Non-anonymous rules satisfying
monotonicity and ordinal covariance are easy to construct; for example,
consider a dictatorship:
Tu = u(1).
These rules generally are also not !-decomposable.
Monotonicity: The rule discussed here is somewhat strange; and we do not
recommend it as a normatively appealing rule; it is merely exhibited to
demonstrate independence of the axioms. Now de￿ne
Tu =
￿
infi u(i) if ju(N)j < +1
liminfi u(i) otherwise .
Thus, if there are only a ￿nite number of utility values that agents have
in a society, the rule recommends the in￿mal such value. Otherwise, it
recommends the limit inferior.
Ordinal covariance: In this case, let T be a constant rule; for example, let Tu =










An interesting fact is that these results do not extend to continuum of agents (or
higher cardinalities of agents) models. For example, consider the rule, which is
a kind of ￿countable lim sup,￿which speci￿es that the utility of a society is the
smallest value for which an at most countable number of agents receive at least
that value. This rule satis￿es all of the axioms we have posited, yet it is not
strictly speaking a inf, sup, lim inf, or lim sup. An interesting question is to
study these generalized limit concepts for arbitrary cardinalities of agents.References
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